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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the evolution of production systems from
craft or job shops to conventional mass production and then to flexible
design and production systems. The major argument is that factory
concepts and technologies have been evolving in two directions: First,
they have become more versatile in the variety of products they can
produce, resulting from innovations in production and design technology
as well as management techniques. Second, companies have extended
factory-like tools and techniques backward toward design operations,
gradually bringing more discipline, automation, and thus efficiency into
the realm of engineering work, including the relatively new field of
computer programming. The result, in both manufacturing and design,
has been a shift from simple scale economies, as in conventional mass
production, to scope economies -- efficiencies gained in the design and
production of multiple products. n examination of how flexible-factory
tools and techniques have been applied in large-scale software
development illustrates these trends.
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1. Introduction
Factory systems emerged in the 1800s as various industries attempted to move
the process of product replication beyond the "craft" stage -- where highly skilled
craftsman treated each job and each product as unique -- to a more efficient mode of
operations aimed at economies of scale. Rather than making products one at a time,
new efficiencies came through standardized and interchangeable parts, fixed and
simplified production procedures, use of less skilled workers with divisions of labor,
mechanization or automation, and stricter process and quality as well as accounting
controls. Factory systems decreased the flexibility' of production organizations that
could once adapt to any job and make a variety of products, and presented new
difficulties in labor relations as employees had to adapt to routinized work.
Nonetheless, factories offered an efficient way to make sophisticated goods of
standardized quality and low costs, thus bringing an array of products once too
expensive into the reach of the average consumer.
This article discusses the evolution of production systems from craft or job
shops to conventional mass production and then to flexible design and production
systems. The major argument, detailed in Section 2, is that factory concepts and
technologies have been evolving in two directions: First, they have become more
versatile in the variety of products they can produce, resulting from innovations in
production and design technology as well as management techniques. Second,
companies have extended factory-like tools and techniques backward toward design
operations, gradually bringing more discipline, automation, and thus efficiency into
the realm of engineering work. The result, in both manufacturing and design, has
been a shift from simple economies of scale, as in the conventional mass production of
a limited number of products, to economies of scope -- efficiencies gained in the design
and production of multiple products. The third section of this article provides an
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illustration of these trends by examining how companies have applied factory-like
tools and techniques to large-scale software development since the 1960s, beginning
with General Electric, AT&T, and System Development Corporation in the United
States, and then Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu in Japan.
2. Evolution of Design and Production Systems
2.1 Customization Versus Replication
For most products, design and production require several distinct steps or
phases, proceeding moreor less sequentially, with some iterations and overlaps. Most
products begin with an idea generated by manufacturers, suppliers, or consumers
that seems to define an existing or future customer need. Companies then experiment
with concepts and create a formal concept proposal. Next, this must be translated into
a detailed design, and the resulting documentation or blueprints then become
prototypes. When the designers and prototype builders are satisfied, the completed
design becomes a production model, which can be tested and refined further [42, 58,
72, 78].
The sequence ends with the production model if there is only one job -- one
product, one customer. In this case, the product and the process needed to make it
might be customized in an organization such as a job shop by workers that resemble
the craftsmen or artisans who made a variety of products before the advent of mass-
production factories. If there is more than one potential customer, a firm can create
different types of organizations aimed at replicating this design with varying levels
of efficiency and output volumes from a few (batch production) to many (mass
production).
From the customers' point of view, a product is customized only if it is tailored
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for their specific needs. From the producers' point of view, however, there are
several options. Some new designs can be customized or "made from scratch," while
others reuse designs, components, tools, processes, or particular people from other
projects. Volume of replication, degree of components or design reuse, and
continuity of process know-how, as well as the coordination mechanisms needed to
manage design and production tasks, are some variables distinguishing different
types of product-development and production approaches. These distinctions are
important because academics as well as managers have used them to explain the
principles behind both job shops and factories, and thus the logic that suggests what
processes and methods of organization seem most appropriate for particular
situations.
In the case of software, for example, making a new and especially a large-scale
program can be a highly complicated process of design, coding, and testing. Since
key development tasks have been difficult to standardize, structure, and automate,
many managers have viewed software as most appropriate for a job-shop or craft
approach that treats each project as unique and relies on highly skilled engineers.
This approach may seem suitable also because replication of a completed program is a
simple, almost instantaneous electronic process, requiring no complex manufacturing
or assembly operations. On the other hand, when software producers or other kinds
of design and engineering organizations encounter a lot of commonality or redundancy
from project to project, then it becomes possible to reuse designs or components or
institute some level of standardization and automation that aids the organization in
development products efficiently in multiple projects. As discussed below, the
realization that there are common design elements and engineering methodologies
useful for similar but distinct projects has made factory-like tools and techniques
possible in software development and other design tasks.
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2.2 Interpretations of Production Systems
Modern factories emerged when firms introduced a series of product and
process innovations that made possible the efficient replication of a limited number of
designs in massive quantities. These facilities captured what have been called
economies of scale -- efficiencies that come when average production costs per unit of
output for a particular product decline as total volumes of production increase, at
least up to a certain limit [16, 41, 59]. Specific characteristics of an industry and its
environment (degree of divisibility of processing equipment and operations, degree
of product and process standardization or complexity) seem to have determined
whether firms could or should move to factory-oriented modes of design and
production. While factory manufacturing can be highly efficient, usually managers
have considered it economically feasible onlywith high production volumes and limited
as well as stable product designs, due to the large capital requirements usually
needed to introduce mass-production systems and the time usually needed to change
equipment for different product models.
Various authors have discussed these characteristics as well as benefits and
limitations of factories and alternative kinds of production processes, including those
that preceded mass production. For example, Woodward identified three basic types
of organizations or processes: unit or craft production (job-shop and small-batch),
large-batch and mass production, and continuous processing operations as in chemical
manufacturing [75]. Unit or job-shop production has non-standard inputs and
outputs -- i.e. each finished product, and the components that go into it, tend to be
different. Therefore, managers are unable to standardize materials or formalize
development processes. Job-shop organizations typically require many ad hoc
adjustments to make a product; to allow workers to make these adjustments, managers
exert control only at a low level, that is, usually by first-line supervisors. It also
5
seems important for supervisors and workers to be highly skilled -- hence the label
craft seems appropriate for this mode of operation. In general, in job-shop or small
batch production, the lack of standardization in processes and products, and
managementcontrols, as well as high skill requirements, make itdifficultformanagers
to find scale economies.
Factory systems replaced craft modes of production as firms learned how to
rationalize product designs as well as production work itself. In describing the
evolution of factories during the 18th and 19th centuries in Britain, Europe and the
United States, initially with products such as textiles, guns, agricultural machinery,
and sewing machines, Chandler and Hounshell noted how managers raised worker
productivity and lowered unit costs by standardizing and then integrating production
processes in large, centralized facilitiEs; developing interchangeable components;
closely coordinating the flow of each process; dividing and specializing labor;
mechanizing or automating tasks; and imposing rigid managerial, accounting, and
other types of controls [15, 27]. Hunt saw this evolution in terms of distinct "ages,"
such as from craft to machinery, exemplified by the use of steam engines in factory
mass production during the 18th century, to the power age after the introduction of
electricity [28]. Landes similarly described this transition -- often labelled "the
industrial revolution" -- as involving the substitution of mechanical devices for human
skills and inanimate power for human or animal strength [39].
But while factory organizations provided higher worker and capital
productivity, the nature of the processes, equipment, and worker job routines made
it difficult to introduce new products or processes quickly and economically, or to
meet the demands of customers with distinctive tastes. Because new technologies or
product and processes variations continue to appear in most industries, and because
not all customers want commodity products, factory-oriented design and production
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systems have never completely replaced craftsman or job shops.
A key topic in the field of production and operations management has thus been
this problem of how to match different types of products with different approaches to
production or product replication. Hayes and Wheelright [24] as well as Schmenner
[62], for example, have refined distinctions found in Woodward and elaborated on the
characteristics of different processes as well as the specific product and market
characteristics that should accompany each. Abernathy and Utterback have argued
as well as that many industries tend to mature in a sort of "life cycle" whereby product
innovations tend to decrease over time. This maturation, although by no means
certain or uniform in all industries, at times allows firms to take advantage of
accumulated experience and introduce process innovations aimed at improving
efficiency [1]. At the facility level, product and process standardization has made
it possible to move from project or job-shop modes of operation to mass-production or
continuous manufacturing (Figure 1).
A common problem, however, is the inflexibility firms often encounter when
moving toward large-scale factories and continuous production, because designs and
processes became difficult and expensive to change. Abernathy and Wayne [2] used
the experience of Ford and its Model T production facilities in the 1920s to demonstrate
how a company can face bankruptcy by pushing process rationalization and scale
economies too far -- for example, assuming product technology or consumer tastes
were more stable than they were, and making investments in expensive and rigid
factory systems that took long periods of time to change to accommodate new models
or production techniques.
Piore and Sabel [60] have extended this line of argument to assert that mass
production in general -- any attempt to use special-purpose machinery and semi-
skilled workers to make standardized goods -- is nearly obsolete, as both markets and
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workers have come to demand more variety in products and discretion in work
environments than mass-production firms can deliver. Their interpretation is that
"flexible specialization" -- the use of numerous small, specialized suppliers, relying
on relatively skilled workers -- will supplant mass production in large organizations.
Other authors have placed less emphasis on suppliers but have also argued that
conventional mass production is more or less obsolete in many industries where it once
dominated, typified by automobiles, with "lean production" as represented initially
by a series of Japanese manufacturing techniques emerging as the new dominant
approach. These techniques include more versatile equipment, workers, and
suppliers, as well as more manufacturing in small rather than large production lots,
which keeps inventories low, catches mistakes quickly, offers customers more product
variety, and matches product mixes more accurately with market needs [17, 18, 38,
51, 63, 74].
Following in the tradition of Woodward and later production-management
literature, various organizational theorists have concluded not that one approach is
obsolete but rather that no one structure is appropriate for all competitive situations
and technologies [7, 22, 40, 49, 57]. In other words, as Woodward suggested,
specific approaches fit particular conditions better than others. For example,
Mintzberg [49] and Borum [12] characterized the environments in which firms operate
as a mixture of stable or dynamic, and simple or complex. An environment that is
complex and dynamic should bemet with organizational responses of "adhocracry" and
"mutual adjustment" -- denoting craft modes of operation rather than factory-type
structures that would better fit characteristics such as "machine bureaucracy" and
work-process standardization (Table 1). If these characteristics determine which
products should be made in what organizations, then new and unstandardized
technologies, or products with truly unique features and requirements for each job
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or user, would seem to be poor candidates for rigid factory modes of production.
Software would fall into this category as well, except in applications that, over time,
have become relatively routineor contain high degrees of redundancy even in systems
that require some degree of tailoring for different users.
Another classification scheme, suggested by Perrow [57], adds further insights
into when factory-like discipline or structu ring of work might apply to different kinds
of production and even product-development operations such as software. In
focusing on task variability and the analysis of technical problems, Perrow argued
that organizations dealing with "routine technologies" encounter few exceptions and
therefore face problems that, over time, become possible to analyze and solve th rough
formal procedures or tools. A standardized process then eliminates the need to have
large numbers of highly-skilled (and usually expensive) professionals capable of re-
inventing solutions each time problems or projects occur. Firms dealing with what
Perrow called "engineering technologies" encounter more exceptions, but the
problems are still relatively well-defined and manageable systematically. Perrow
contrasted routine and engineering technologies with "craft technologies," defined
by problems of a limited range but ill-defined and therefore difficult to analyze, as
well as "non-routine technologies," which required many exceptional and difficult
tasks (Table 2).
The literature thus offers a variety of historical and organizational explanations
for different types of production organizations as well as specific product-process
typologies for both production management and more intellectual forms of work,
including design and engineering tasks or even service operations. A common theme
in various literatures is thatfirms need to find an appropriate match, which in essence
means a proper balance between efficiency and flexibility. Factory systems and
counterparts in engineering or service businesses may offer a more efficient means of
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managing operations than in craft-like organizations, but with limitations on the
versatility of the organization in the sense of being able to accommodate variety or
exceptions.
Table3 presents a stylized comparison of the basic strategies, characteristics,
and tradeoffs that might accompany a conventional factory and craft or job-shop type
of organization. It is clear that mass-production factories, or their analogies for
engineering operations, are not appropriate for all types of products or competitive
strategies; they have traditionally worked best for limited numbers of designs suited
to mass replication and mass consumption. The craft approach, typified by the job
shop, offers a less efficient process at least for commodity products but remains
necessary for technologies that are still new or emerging, and continues to serve
specific market niches, such as for tailoring products for individual needs.
2.3 Flexible Design and Production
Interpretations of factory production cited above assume that organizations
adopting mass production accept an inherent tradeoff -- more efficiency for less
flexibility, particularly in product variety (see Figure 1 ). But, in several industries,
new managerial and engineering techniques, along with advanced computerized
technologies, have been reducing this tradeoff of flexibility for efficiency. The
general effect has been to shift competitive emphases from either low-cost production
or product differentiation to making different products at low cost. This is achieved
not through simple economies of scale based on the mass replication of a small number
of designs, but through scope economies based on efficiencies in the design and
production of a variety of products in individual production or engineering facilities
[9]. This shift has required both (1) the introduction of more flexibility into
production processes concerned with product replication, and (2) the introduction of
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more efficiency into design and engineering processes concerned with product
customization.
Several examples illustrate the kinds of tools and techniques that have
facilitated this evolution. Many firms have found ways to design products from
component modules that can be configured in different ways, group together similar
components to gain efficiencies in engineering and production, decrease the set-up
times required for production equipment to change over to different products, and
employ workers and suppliers that are relatively skilled and able to make a variety of
end products in relatively small volumes rather than in massive quantities but with
high levels of productivity and quality. Japanese automobile producers led in the
introduction of this approach to manufacturing, which differs from conventional mass
production, although producers of machinetools, semiconductors, and other products
have used similar approaches to combine job-shop flexibility in end-product variety
with the productivity, standardized quality, and low cost structure of automated
factories [3, 30].
An important concept for both manufacturing and design used in various
industries, called "group technology," involves putting together similar parts,
problems, or tasks to facilitate scheduling of parts production, arranging factory
layouts, or rationalizing product design and engineering. The underlying principle
here is clearly economies of scope rather than of scale, at least as measured by the
number of identical components produced through a given process. Critical to any
group-technology scheme is a coding system, similar to library references, that makes
it possible to classify characteristics related to manufacturing, engineering,
purchasing, or other functions. In engineering, parts might be classified by
geometric similarities, and matched with process plans and machines capableof making
parts to those specifications. Or designs for certain categories of parts might be
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coded and filed, so that engineers would have ready access to old drawings and not
have to "reinvent the wheel" more than once. Advances in computer processing
capacity and in programming sophistication have facilitated development of the coding
and retrieval systems needed for group technology to work well for large numbers of
items, leading to extensive monetary savings in firms. The basic concept, however,
is as old as interchangeable parts [29].
Computer-aided tools for design and engineering have been particularly useful
for efficiently designing and replicating a variety of products from standardized
parts, with much of the design knowledge incorporated into computer programs or
databases, rather than relying exclusively o. very highly skilled people. Many
computer-aided tools employ coding schemes that rely on what are, essentially,
g roup-technology concepts, and provide semi-automated supportforthe selection and
modification of standardized components. Integrating computer-aided design tools
with flexible computer-aided or computer-integrated manufacturing systems
(variously referred to as CAD/CAM, FMS, CIM) makes it possible to test different
design and processing ideas on a computer screen and then transfer completed
digitalized designs to automated manufacturing tools, with little or no penalty
associated with low production volumes, because automation largely eliminates costly
labor-intensive processes. The result is that customers do not have to pay high prices
for fully customized products; nor do they have to put up with standardized
commodity products that are inexpensive but do not fulfill their needs satisfactorily.
An important demonstration of this capability is in application-specific
integrated circuit (ASIC) design, one of the fastest growing areas of the
semiconductor industry. One method is to mass produce gate-array chips, which
contain transistors laid out in fixed rows; a designer then uses an automated tool
which follows programmed design rules to create "custom-routed" connections to fit
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different applications. Another approach is to develop standard cells, which contain
small logic combinations, which can be configured in different ways. At even higher
level of abstraction and standardization is the alternative of building standardized
"megacells" such as graphics controllers, arithmetic logic units, or microprocessors,
that, using computer-aided design tools, can be configured easily into different chip
designs. CAD tools can select routing combinations or configurations on the basis of
programmable rules, as well as perform simulations and testing functions to aide the
design process. VLSI Technology, Inc. (VTI) in the United States has even
standardized around design tools simple enough for non-specialists to use, and
created what management refers to as an ASIC "design factory":
Design engineers are the bulk of the work force now at VTl's dispersed
design centers.... One needs rudimentary knowledge of how to use the
work station software -- as a CAD or drafting tool -- to copy schematics
onto the system. It requires care and attention to detail -- but not
extensive engineering training. A technician with a high school or
associate degree is adequate. We can save engineering time for better
use, and partition the design "production" process into a more elaborate
division of labor, utilizing both computer and human resources more
efficiently. Work can move along like in a factory, f rom person to person,
task to task. The manager maintains line balances by allocating human
and computer resources [italics added] [31, p. 15].
In short, evidence from various fields indicates that factories no longer need
to be rigid manufacturing organizations, while engineering and design work no longer
needs to be done completely by hand. Craft or job shops may still be most appropriate
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for totally new or completely unstandardized products, very low-volume products, or
unique market segments. But new concepts of manufacturing and design, supported
by computer-aided technologies, have made it possible to combine flexibility and
efficiency in factories as well as engineering organizations. Table 4 summarizes some
of the features one might expect in a design and manufacturing system emphasizing
at least temporarily standardized but evolving processes and tools, modularized
components, and the production of semi-customized products. If integrated in a single
organization, this approach might describe a flexible design and production system
capable of offering customers a variety of products at potentially lower prices than
traditional craft production.
A simple way to conceptualize the distinctions among craft or job-shop
organizations, conventional factories, and flexible design and production systems,
is to visualize a spectrum reflecting how much emphasis each approach places on
tailoring products or production processes to specific customers or market segments.
In practice, the spectrum is probably continuous, but it can be thought of as
containing three basic options: (1) Full Customization: design and manufacture
unique products, where each is different and each process -- tools, components,
specific work rules, team members -- are also different. (2) Semi-Customization:
design a semi-customized (or semi-standardized) product, where a standard
procedure is to reuse some or all components from stock and configure them in
different ways for different customers. (3) Full Standardization: design and
manufacture a commodity-type product, where components are interchangeable, or
where components and final products are mass produced, using a standardized
process.
Full customization and full standardization apply most directly to industries
clearly segmented among users who desi re either fully tailored products or low-priced
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commodities. But even if customers demand different products, companies might still
find they can recycle at least some designs or components for some period of time, as
well as reuse procedures, controls, tools, tests, and documentation. Therefore,
unless each product, and the process and people required to design and build it, are
entirely different, semi-customization, benefitting from at least some economies of
scope, if not scale, should be possible. Furthermore, even firms making commodity
products for the mass market can choose to reuse components or other inputs. Thus
semi-customization is a product-process option that firms seeking to meet the needs
of a broad range of customers might select.
A firm might introduce semi-customization and a flexible design and production
system where there is a need for professional-level skilled workers but with at least
some stability or predictability in customer requirements or product designs.
Semi-customization as a product-process option would-thus allow the firm to capture
repeatable elements for some period of time, while allowing for the addition of new
components, tools, or processes to meet the distinctive needs or customers or to
accommodate incremental changes in technology or markets. In these cases,
producers face what Perrow viewed as engineering technologies: some exceptions in
product requirements but relatively well-defined tasks, perhaps because of similar
customer needs but also reflecting management efforts to create permanent groups of
people experienced in particular applications and to channel similar work to these
focused facilities. The challenge here would be to standardize temporarily -- leaving
room for at least incremental evolution -- basic tasks and, especially, the knowledge
or tools needed to deal with a range of common problems; and divide labor only for
clearly defined tasks when it is necessary to leverage the most skilled employees
across multiple projects. The result is to de-skill work or formalize rules and
procedures only in a relative sense, compared to modes of operations before managers
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explicitly adopted factory strategies or to implicitly ad-hoc approaches with little or
no formal structu res. These management policies would combine some of the flexibility
of craft or job shops, in that they remained adaptable enough to make unique or
customized designs as well as to evolve, with some of the efficiencies of engineering
and factory production, but based on scope rather than scale economies across a
series of projects.
The typology and organizational options should be available in any market
where there is some segmentation and at least some temporary standardization of
needs, basic technologies, and development processes. Taking the example of
software development, rather than viewing this as a single market requiring a single
process, such as the craft approach, one can define a high-end custom segment, such
as for unique defense or plant-automation systems. Producers focus on optimizing
product performance and process flexibility; they experience few economies of scale
or scope, at least for totally new jobs, but customers usually pay high premiums. On
the other end of the spectrum, such as for standardized programs like word-
processing packages, firms need to produce "best-selling" products suitable for many
users; therefore, at least for the first generation of a product, may not want to try
to structure the development pi'ocess. With a successful effort, however, they can
maximize economies of scale -- not in development but in program replication,
achieving profits through small margins on high sales volumes. There is also a middle-
segment to the market, where the "factory" approach and "semi-custom" best
characterize both products and processes. Some customers are sensitive to
combinations of price and performance; producers, as a result, attempt to exploit
commonality or automation across multiple projects, offering more customization than
fully standardized systems and less unique features, but lower prices, better
reliability, or faster delivery than fully customized systems. (Table 5).
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3. The Case of Software2
Software factories emerged within the computer industry as producers
attempted to push forward the state of programming practice in order to move beyond
loosely organized craft or job-shop modes of operation that treated each project as
unique. The result was not conventional mass production and scale economies, since
product replication is a simple electronic process, the key tasks in software work
consist of activities such as design and testing, and even software products reusing
large amounts of components from other systems still contain unique or customized
featu res. Software factories came to resemble flexible design and production systems
aimed at scope economies achieved through managing multiple design or engineering
projects systematically, rather than treating each project or job as unique. This
approach has relied on permanent development groups dedicated to particular families
of products (rather than forming and disbanding groups at the completion of each
project), process R&D groups that develop or refine standardized methods and tools
(software programs and databases that facilitate the writing of other software),
planned rather than "accidental" or ad hoc reuse of program components and designs,
some divisions of labor to leverage the most highly skilled people across multiple
projects, common training programs, and disciplined procedures for project
management as well as product quality control.
Some firms in the United States and Europe have introduced these and other
concepts for large-scale programming operations, but in varying degrees. IBM was
the leader in the United States after it had to organize the development of several
operating systems for its innovative System 360 family of computers during the 1960s
and then for the next generation System 370 machines. IBM did not explicitly adopt
the factory analogy, however, and continued to allow programming centers and
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individual projects to operate with large degrees of autonomy, especially for
applications programs [19]. The discussion here focuses on the specific origins of the
term "factory" as used in software and the histories of several companies and facilities
that have explicitly used this concept to manage software development.
3.1 The Development Process
Software programming, even in factory environments, is not like conventional
manufacturing but more closely resembles design and engineering. It is essentially
a process of analysis and translation: analyzing a problem and then breaking it down
into a series of smaller tasks expressed in a manner ultimately understandable to a
computer. Software developers begin by translating problems into design
specifications and then design specifications into source code written in a high-level
(English-like) computer language. The next step is to translate the high-level
program into a lower-level machine-language called object code, consisting of zeros
and ones that serve as instructions for the computer hardware. Special computer
programs called assemblers and compilers usually perform this transformation
automatically [5, 61].
The development cycle continues in that software must still be tested and
frequently changed, repaired, or enhanced (maintained), before and after delivery
to users. In terms of time and costs, excluding those incurred during operations and
maintenance, testing is usually the most labor-intensive phase, followed by
implementation (detailed design and coding) and high-level (functional) design. For
a product that continues in service with periodic modifications, post-delivery
maintenance may become by far the most costly activity, consuming up to 70% or so of
total expenditures over its lifetime, according to commonly-cited data on life-cycle
costs [11 ]. New generations of computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools are
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also automating increasing aspects of the development process and changing these
life-cycle costs, although most software development in the early 1990s, especially
new and large projects, remained a complex, labor-intensive, and expensive process.
One reason is that, while most software projects go through similar phases that
appear sequential, as in other kinds of product development, the design and
production process is often highly iterative, requiring developers to go back and
forth among requirements analysis, specification, program design, coding, testing,
redesign, re-testing, and so on. Experienced engineers or managers may give
precise estimates of the time and labor each phase requires for particular applications,
although numerous uncertainties upset schedules and budgets and thus make software
development something less than an exact discipline. This is especially true since
project requirements mightcontain newfunctions that are difficultto build, customers
often change their minds about features they desire, and individuals usually take
different amounts of time to perform similar operations. Furthermore, the larger
projects become, the more interdependent activities and components they require, and
the greater the uncertainty of the final product's cost, schedule, and performance.
Huge variations in personnel performance -- as much as 26 to 1 in studies
comparing the programming productivity of the best people to the worst [32, 55] --
appear to stem from differences not simply in native ability, but also in the particular
experiences of the individual. Someone who has written an inventory-control system
in the past probably can complete another inventory-control system in less time than
it would take a novice. The relationship of experience to productivity reflects the
reality that software, though a generic type of product or technology, may vary
enormously in content. The number and type of operations a program must perform
in each application greatly affect the amount of thought, time, and experience
required to solve design problems and writeor test computer code. The need to adjust
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to each application or situation makes it difficult for producers to establish and
maintain standards, controls, and schedules, as well as divide labor, automatetasks,
and reuse components -- strategies common in factory production or in highly
structured engineering operations. As a result, loosely-structured job-shop
approaches, with people, tools, methods, procedures, and designs changed, if
necessary, for each project, remain highly suitable for many software projects.
This does not mean, however, that the craft approach is best for all kinds of
software projects. To the contrary, job-shop or craft-oriented approaches make it
difficult for software developers to share experiences in problem solving and apply
potentially useful solutions arrived at in one project -- such as tools, methods,
procedures, and product designs -- to other projects. One might even argue that
both the difficultyor inappropriateness of product and process standardization across
different projects, as well as insufficient efforts toward this end, contribute to the
recurrence of similar problems year after year. Various software producers have in
fact identified what problems they commonly face and then built an infrastructure --
of tools, methods, reusable components, and permanent groups of people, not unlike
the approaches of factory organizations or disciplined engineering departments in
other industries -- to manage these problems more effectively.
Factory-like approaches that resemble flexible design and production systems
(rather than craft approaches or conventional mass production) became the dominant
methodology for software development at Japan's largest computer manufacturers
during the 1970s and 1980s. They became popular because of several conditions in the
Japanese market. First was the enormous demand for labor-intensive custom
applications that had high levels of redundancy among projects, estimated at up to 90%
across delivered programs [6, 35]. The Japanese also suffered from a severe
shortage of skilled programmers since the 1960s and continuing through the present
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[4, 25, 56]. Furthermore, Japanese producers tend to follow U. S. product standards
and concentrate not on software invention but on improving the programming process
and the "price-performance" of computer systems they deliver. The Japanese have
also recognized that, as in other industries, customers are sensitive to a combination
of price, delivery, and reliability, as well as features. These conditions made the
benefits of a flexible factory approach -- more predicable project and quality control,
high system reliability, cheaper prices, and quicker delivery, based on the recycling
of proven designs -- appealing to both Japanese producers and consumers [20, 23,
34, 66, 67, 70, 71].
3.2 Early U.S. Proposals and the SDC Factory
The earliest public proposals for the introduction of explicit factory methods,
tools, and management systems to software development appeared in the late 1960s,
as outgrowths of comparisons of programming with established engineering and
manufacturing processes. An engineer at General Electric, R.W. Bemer, made
numerous suggestions that culminated in a paper encouraging GE to develop a
software factory to reduce variability in programmer productivity through
standardized tools, a computer-based interface, and an historical database for
financial and management control. GE's exit from the computer business in 1970 ended
the company's commitment to commercial hardware and software production, although
Bemer provided the industry's first working definition of what might constitute a
softwa re factory:
[A] software factory should be a programming environment residing
upon and controlled by a computer. Program construction, check-out
and usage should be done entirely within this environment, and by using
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the tools contained in the environment... A factory... has measures and
controls for productivity and quality. Financial records are kept for
costing and scheduling. Thus management is able to estimate from
previous data... Among the tools to be available in the environment
should be: compilers for machine-independent languages; simulators,
instrumentation devices, and test cases as accumulated; documentation
tools -- automatic flow-charters, text editors, indexers; accounting
function devices; linkage and interface verifiers; code filters (and many
others) [10, pp. 1626-1627].
While Bemer focused on standardized tools and controls, Dr. M.D. Mcllroy of
AT&T emphasized another factory-like cc ncept - - systematic reusability of code when
constructing new programs. In an address at a 1968 NATO Science Conference on
software engineering, Mcllroy argued that the division of software programs into
modules offered opportunities for "mass production" methods. He then used the term
"factory" in the context of facilities dedicated to producing parameterized families of
software parts or routines that would serve as building blocks for tailored programs
reusable across different computers [48]. But reception to Mcl I roy's ideas was mixed:
It seemed too difficult to create program modules that would be efficient and reliable
for all types of systems and which did not constrain the user. Software was also
heavily dependent on the specific characteristics of hardware. Nor did anyone know
how to catalog program modules so they could be easily found and reused [26].
Nonetheless, by the late 1960s, theterm factory had arrived in software and was being
associated with computer-aided tools and management-control systems, as well as
modularization and reusability.
In fact, one of the U.S. leaders in the custom software field, System
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Development Corporation, formerly a part of the Rand Corporation and in 1991 a
Unisys division, established the first U.S. software facility called a factory in 1975-
1976. SDC had been separated from Rand in the 1950s to develop the SAGE missile
control system for the U.S. Department of Defense. It later took on other real-time
programming tasks as a special government-sponsored corporation, but went public
in 1970. Top management then had to control software costs and launched a process-
oriented R&D effort in 1972 to tackle five problems SDC programmers continued to
encounter project after project: (1) Lack of discipline and repeatability or
standardized approaches to the development process. (2) Lack of an effective way to
visualize and control the production process, as well as to measure before a project
was completed how well code implemented a design. (3) Difficulty in accurately
specifying performance requirements before detailed design and coding, and
recurrence of disagreements on the meaning of certain requirements, or changes
demanded by the customer. (4) Lack of standardized design, management, and
verification tools, making it necessary to reinvent these from project to project. (5)
Little capability to reuse components, despite the fact that many application areas
used similar logic and managers believed that extensive use of off-the-shelf software
modules would significantly shorten the time required for software development [13,
14].
After several years of R&D work, a team of SDC engineers, led by John B.
"Jack" Munson, constructed a detailed factory plan that consisted of three elements:
an integrated set of tools (program library, project databases, on-line interfaces
between tools and databases, and automated support systems for verification,
documentation, etc. ); standardized procedures and management policies for program
design and implementation; and a matrix organization, separating high-level system
design (at customer sites) from program development (at the Software Factory). The
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first site to utilize the factory system, which SDC copyrighted under the name "The
Software Factory," was a facility of about 200 programmers in Santa Monica,
California. SDC thus continued to have "program offices" at each customer site, with
managers that maintained responsibility throughout the life-cycle for project
management, customer relations, requirements and performance specifications,
systems engineering, and quality control and assurance. To build the actual software
and test it, however, program managers that wanted to use the factory (its usage was
not mandatory) had to transfer system specifications to what was essentially an
assembly line of three groups within the new software factory, which served SDC's
System Division: Computer Program Design, Computer Program Development, and
System Test and Verification.
SDC gave the name Factory Support System to the "basic structural and control
components" designed to facilitate the factory methodology. This tool set, written in
a high-level language to ease portability, ran on an I BM 370 mainframe computer and
used the facilities of I BM's operating system to automate procedu res for keeping track
of program development and collecting data. Tools included compilers and other basic
programs that worked with the operating system, as well as Top-Down System
Developer (TOPS), a modeling tool that helped outline and verify designs as well as
describe much of the control and data interface logic in the actual coding language;
Program Analysis and Test Host (PATH), which analyzed a source program and
inserted calls to a recording program at appropriate locations, helping developers find
information about the structure of the program to aid in testing; Integrated
Management, Project Analysis, and Control Techniques (IMPACT), which utilized
production information on milestones, tasks, resources, system components, and their
relationships to provide schedule, resource computation, and status reports at the
individual components level or summarized at any module or task hierarchy level.
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It took a year and a half during 1975-1976 for the R&D team to identify
standards and procedures -- general rules and specific guidelines -- that might be
appl ied to a va riety of softwa re p rojects. They based thei r process a rou nd a l ife-cycle
model of software development covering the major activities, events, and product
components common to all projects. The methodology, codified in what SDC called the
Software Development Manual or SDM, called for structured design and coding, top-
down program development, and program production libraries. In addition, SDM
outlined a management and control process, providing guidelines for planning, project
control, review and evaluation procedures, and quality assurance. The R&D team in
part borrowed from existing U. S. military standards, but established mostof the SDM
methodology by examining previous projects SDC had done through written records
and interviewing personnel to determine what had worked well and appeared to
represent "best practice" within the company. According to two of the key factory
architects, Harvey Bratman and Terry Court, this effort was critical to creating a
common language and methodology that made the factory morethan just a building with
programmers working from a common pile of tools.
Approximately 10 projects went through the SDC Software Factory between 1976
and 1978, including systems for weather-satellite control, air defense, and
communications for the Los Angeles Police Department. SDC managers claim that all
the projects, with the exception of the system for the L.A. Police, came in on time and
within budget, and with fewer defects and problems than SDC usually experienced
with large systems. The company history even described the factory projects as, for
the most part, "accurate, timely, and on budget," and models of "optimum software
development" [8, pp. 205, 224]. In fact, the factory worked so well that SDC's chief
executive, George Mueller, directed all divisions to adopt the methodology as a
corporate standard, and in 1978 he promoted Munson to oversee this transfer.
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After Munson left, however, the factory fell gradually into disuse. Tools were
not very portable among different projects; program managers preferred to build
their own software, rather than hand over specifications to the factory; and
specifying the L.A. Police system, which was an unfamiliar application for SDC
engineers, took a year or more longer than scheduled, leaving factory programmers
idle as the number of other new projects coming into the facility declined. Future jobs
also went back to the project system, rather than using the factory structure for
program development. The factory methodology remained through the SDM manual,
although SDC dispersed the factory personnel among different projects and sites.
SDC also updated the manual every few years and continued to use it through the late
1980s, while concepts from the factory methodology spread to other firms after the
U.S. Department of Defense contracted with SDC in 1976 to devise guidelines for
military-use software procurement. SDC completed a first set in 1979, with the help
of the U.S. Department of Defense and an offshoot of MIT's Lincoln Laboratories,
Mitre Corporation; the government subsequently published these procedures as a 16-
volume set of guidebooks on software acquisition and management [8]. Perhaps most
important, SDC also influenced factory initiatives underway or soon to appear in
Japan.
3.3 Hitachi: Organizing for Process and Quality Control
Hitachi boasted the oldest and largest software factories in Japan (Table 6).
Its Software Development Center (formerly the Software Works), established in 1969,
had approximately 4000 personnel in 1991, including approximately 2000 assigned from
Hitachi subsidiaries and subcontractors. This built a range of basic software for
Hitachi mainframes, including operating systems, language compilers, and database
systems. The Information Systems Development Center (formerly called the Omori
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Works and then the System Design Works), separated from the original factory in
1985, housed 7000 software developers (including at least 4000 personnel from
subsidiaries and subcontractors) in two 31-story towers. This facility, unlike some
other Japanese applications software factories, combined systems engineers (those
who designed the systems) with programmers that built the actual software (did the
module design, coding, and testing). It concentrated on customized business
applications such as for financial institutions, securities firms, inventory control,
management information, accounting, and personnel management.
By founding its Software Works in 1969, Hitachi was the first company in the
world to apply the term factory (actually, its Japanese equivalent, kojo, translated
either as "factory" or "works") to an actual software facility [25]. 3 A history of
independent factories for each major product area prompted executives in the
computer division to create a separate facility for software when this became a major
activity. The factory represented a deliberate attempt to transform software from an
unstructured "service" to a "product" with a guaranteed level of cost and quality,
using a centralized organization to achieve productivity and reliability improvements
through process standardization and control. Management saw a need to offset a
severe shortage of skilled prog, ammers in Japan and deal with numerous complaints
from customers regarding defects in the software Hitachi was providing (most of
which, along with the hardware, Hitachi was importing from RCA until 1970). It was
also important that all Hitachi factories had to adopt corporate accounting and
administrative standards; these forced software managers to analyze the software
development process in great detail and experiment with a series of work standards
and controls that led to the current factory organization.
Managers concentrated initially on determining standards for productivity and
costs in all phases of development, based on data collected for project management and
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quality control. Hitachi then standardized design around structured programming
techniques in the early 1970s, and reinforced these with training programs for new
employees and managers. This approach reflected an attempt to improve average
skills through a standard process, rather than specify every procedure to be
performed in each project and phase of development.
Yet Hitachi managers underestimated how difficult implementing factory
concepts such as reusability and process standardization would be. Two examples
illustrate this. First, their attempt in the early 1970s to introduce a "components
control system" for reusability failed, because of the lack of knowledge about how to
produce reusable modules. Managers changed ;eair priorities and decided to find a
way to standardize product designs, and then worry about components. A survey of
the programming field suggested that structu red design and prog ramming techniques
would help standardize software design and coding. A committee then spent several
years studying these techniques (as they were evolving) and analyzing programs
Hitachi had already written. This was truly a pioneering move, because it would be
several years before articles in industry journals began discussing structured design
and programming widely and companies such as IBM adopted these practices for their
internal standards.
Hitachi alsofailed to introduceone standardized process for both basic software
and custom applications software. At the start of the factory, a committee for work
standards took on the task of establishing procedures for all activities, based on a
life-cycle model of development. They met almost weekly, studying available materials
on software development and examining practices within Hitachi, and completed a
first-cut set of standards by the end of 1970, referred to as the Hitachi Software
Standards (HSS). These covered product planning, design and coding methodology,
documentation and manuals, testing, and any other activities necessary to complete
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a software product. Although Hitachi managers clearly recognized these procedures
and standards would have to evolve as personnel and technology changed, and they
made provisions to revise performance standards annually, drawing up the
procedures helped them identify best practices within the company and within the
industry for dissemination to all projects and departments. Struggling with work
standards also helped the committee recognize the need to distinguish between basic
systems and applications software, rather than continue trying to impose similar
controls and expectations on all types of software development. Hitachi started
developing separate standards for applications during 1971-1972 and completed an
initial set by 1975 termed HIPACE (Hitachi Phased Approach for High Productive
Computer System Engineering). This standardized formats for proposals, designs,
and program construction, as well as aided in developing tools for design automation.
By the late 1970s, Hitachi had succeeded in organizing its software factory
around a combination of manual engineering and factory techniques -- structured
design and coding coordinated with data collection and standard times for each
activity, detailed documentation, design reviews independent of project personnel,
rigorous defect analysis, and other elements. Only at this point, after spending
years studying and standardizing the development process, was Hitachi management
ready to invest heavily in computer-aided tools, relying on engineers mainly from the
Software Works and the Systems Development Laboratory, part of the central
laboratories.
The tools Hitachi devised supported major functions and activities. For basic
software, during the late 1970s, Hitachi introduced CASD (Computer-Aided Software
Development System) to facilitate design, coding, documentation, and testing, and
then CAPS (Computer-Aided Production Control System for Software) for manpower
estimation, process flow control, and quality control [33, 64]. Both have also been
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continually evolving. For custom applications, in the late 1970s, Hitachi began
developing another set of tools under the label ICAS (Integrated Computer-Aided
Software Engineering System) [36]. The most important consisted of the SEWB
(Software-Engineering Workbench), which supported both system design and
programming on advanced work stations, and EAGLE (Effective Approach to
Achieving High Level Software Productivity), which ran on Hitachi mainframes and
helped programmers build software from reusable modules as well as structure new
designs and code for reuse. HIPACE continued to serve as thebasicmethodology used
with these tools.
Performance improvements were impressive. While direct productivity data is
unavailable, sales per employee at the Software Works, combining systems and
applications programs, doubled afterthefirstyearof foundingthefactory in 1969 and
overall rose 12-fold between 1969 and 1984. The percentage of projects delivered late
to the Quality Assurance Department dropped from over 72% in 1970 to a low of 6.9% in
1974 and averaged about 12% between 1975 and 1985. Defects reported by users per
month for each computer in the field also dropped from an index of 100 in 1978 to 13 in
1983-1984 [19, pp. 184-191]. These process improvements, which were similar at
Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu, came despite dramatic increases in the kinds of programs
Hitachi (as well as its competitors) produced, starting with rudimentary operating
systems to a full slate of basic software and applications ranging from programs for
banks, factory automation, and management information systems, to packages of tools
for customer programming and maintenance support.
3.4 Toshiba: Linking Productivity and Reusability
Toshiba created a highly disciplined factory around focused product lines,
using a centralized software facility to develop real-time process control software for
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industrial applications [44, 45, 46]. The decision to establish a software factory
stemmed from rapid increases in actual and projected demand, beginning around 1975,
for industrial control systems relying on a new generation of relatively inexpensive
minicomputers. Typical of the changing demands Toshiba faced as sales of its control
minicomputers rose were orders from Japanese power-utility companies to develop
automated thermal-power generating stations. These used enormous and growing
amounts of software; the typical power-generation control system rose from a few
hundred thousand lines of code in the mid-1970s to two million by the early 1980s,
necessitating years of development and hundreds of new programmers. Furthermore,
to achieve safe and untended operation, the hardware and software for these and
many other control systems had to be nearly free of defects or at least highly tolerant
of system faults.
An R&D group responsible for industrial systems software in Toshiba, led by
Dr. Yoshihiro Matsumoto, introduced an organization and process in 1977 integrating
tools, methods, management and personnel systems with a physical layout for work
stations (Table 7). The strategy for utilizing this infrastructure centered around
four policies: (1) standardize the development process, to reduce variations among
individuals and individual projects; (2) reuse existing designs and code when
building new systems, to reduce redundant work and maximize productivity; (3)
introduce standardized and integrated tools, to raise the performance levels of the
average programmer; and (4) provide extensive training and career-development
tracks for programmers, to relieve the shortage of skilled engineers. Matsumoto
initially applied this strategy to power-systems software, but gradually extended the
factory approach to all the kinds of systems built within the Fuchu Works.
Perhaps the most delicate feature of Toshiba's Factory was its organizational
structure, a matrix imposed over product departments from several operating groups
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and divisions, all located on one site, Toshiba's Fuchu Works, located in the western
outskirts of Tokyo. The Fuchu Works in 1991 had at least 8000 employees working
primarily in four areas: Information Processing and Control Systems, Energy
Systems, Industrial Equipment, and Semiconductors (Printed Circuit Board
Division). Operating departments within the divisions corresponded roughly to 19
product lines, including systems for information and control in public utilities,
factories, power-generation plants, and various industrial and transportation
equipment. Each department contained sections for hardware and software design as
well as for manufacturing, testing, quality assurance, and product control.
Similarities in the type of software the Fuchu Works built from project to project
allowed Toshiba to deliver "semi-customized" programs that combined reusable
designs and code with newly written modules, rather than writing all software from
scratch. Toshiba also relied heavily on a standardized tool and methodology set, the
Software EngineeringWorkbench (SWB), developed gradually after 1976 and modelled
after AT&T's UNIX Programmers Workbench. Toshiba utilized its customized version
of the UNIX operating system as well as a full complement of tools for design-support,
reusable module identification, code generation, documentation and maintenance,
testing, and project-management. Important features of the Toshiba methodology
were the design of new program modules (ideally limited to 50 lines) for reusability,
the requirement that programmers deposit a certain number of reusable modules in a
library each month, and the factoring in of reuse objectives into project schedules and
budgets [47].
Software productivity at the Toshiba Softwa re Factory rose from 1390 delivered
equivalent-assembler source lines or EASL per person per month in 1976 to over 3100
by 1985, the latest year for which Toshiba has made data publicly available.
Meanwhile, reuse levels (lines of delivered code taken from existing software)
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increased from 13% in 1979 to 48%. The 3130 lines of EASL source code per month per
employee translate into approximately 1000 lines of Fortran, the most common language
Toshiba used in 1985 -- considerably more than the 300 lines or so of new code per
month commonly cited for U.S. programmers making similar real-time applications.
Quality levels (defined as the number of major faults detected after final testing) also
improved dramatically after the opening of the factory, ranging from 7 to 20 per 1000
lines of delivered code converted to EASL to 0.2 to 0.05 in 1985 (the range depended
on quality-control practices as well as the reliability requirements and the amount of
testing customers contracted for) [34, 19].
Toshiba data indicated that reusability was the major reason for productivity
and quality improvements. The organization Toshiba created to promote reuse and
overcome short-term concerns of project managers and development personnel (such
as the longer time required to write and document reusable software) relied on
Software Reusing Parts Steering Committees and a Software Reusing Parts
Manufacturing Department and Software Reusing Parts Center. The factory formed
a steering committee for different areas (with different members, depending on the
application) to determine if customers had a common set of needs suitable for a
package, and then allocated funds from the Fuchu Works' budget for these special
projects. Some packages were usable in different departments, although most served
specific applications. The Reusing Parts Manufacturing Department and Parts Center
evaluated new software (and documentation) to make certain itmetfactory standards;
after certification, engineers registered the software in department or factory reuse
databases (libraries). Registered items required a key-word phrase to represent the
functionality of the part or correspond to a specific object, as well as reuse
documentation that explained the part's basic characteristics.
Management also relied on an integrated set of incentives and controls to
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encourage project managers and personnel to take the time to write reusable software
parts and reuse them frequently. At the start of each project, managers agreed to
productivity targets that they could not meet without reusing a certain percentage of
specifications, designs, or code. Design review meetings held at the end of each
phase in the development cycle then checked how well projects met reuse targets, in
addition to schedules and customer requirements. At the programmer level, when
building new software, management required project members to register a certain
number of components in the reuse databases, for other projects. Personnel received
awards for registering particularly valuable or frequently reused modules, and they
received formal evaluations from superiors on whether they met their reuse targets.
The SWB system, meanwhile, monitored reuse as well as deviations from targets at the
project and individual levels, and sent regular reports to managers.
3.5 NEC: A Multi-Product, Multi-Process Network
The first step toward a factory structure for software development at NEC
consisted of founding the Basic Software Development Division at its Fuchu Works in
1974, thereby separating organizationally operating-systems development from
hardware development. NEC subsequently established other organizations at Mita,
Tamagawa, and Abiko, all within the Tokyo metropolis or suburbs, for its other
software needs. It also dispersed programming work throughout Japan through
numerous subsidiaries and satellite offices [21]. However, the separation and
separate histories of these facilities gradually presented greater problems for
managers pursuing standardization and common goals such as quality improvement
throughout the NEC group. Table 8 and the discussion below summarizes the key
initiatives NEC managers adopted to create a more effective multi-product, multi-
process factory network.
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The Software Strategy Project, started in 1976, attempted to integrate
programming operations on a group-wide basis (including all in-house divisions and
subsidiaries, rather than just the computer division). The objective was to introduce
standards for tools, procedures, and methodologies for all phases of development and
all aspects of management. Yet it took several years of trial and error to accomplish
this while allowing individuals, projects, and divisions sufficient flexibility to tailor
standards tothe needs of their products and customers. When the Software Strategy
Project ended, managers who worked on the effort, led by Dr. Yukio Mizuno, noticed
another weakness in NEC's structure for managing software development: the lack
of permanent staff to explore and follow th rough on key issues or technologies. Thus,
to ensure continuity and proceed beyond the Software Strategy Project, NEC in 1980
established the Software Product Engineering Laboratory to lead the company's
efforts in software engineering R&D, making this organization part of NEC's central
research laboratories. The Software Factory Design Project, started in 1986 under
the auspices of the laboratory, developed guidelines for designing actual software
factories, from higher-level concepts, such as tool and methodology standardization,
to smaller details, such as how to arrange programmers' work spaces or recreation
areas.
NEC's Software Quality Control (SWQC) Program dates back to 1978, when a
handful of NEC managers established a software quality-control study group. Several
specific conclusions came out of their reviews. First, research in software
development indicated a strong correlation between quality and productivity,
reflecting the manpower needed to fix defects. Hence, they concluded that any
revolution in software productivity would require correspondingly dramatic
improvements in quality-control practices. Surveys of NEC projects also supported
the observation that "human factors," i.e. differences in programmer skills and
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experience, seemed to be the most important elements influencing individual
performance, and that NEC had to address training more seriously if it were to make
major advances in productivity or quality [50]. NEC management then set up a
quality-control program that focused on motivation, teamwork methodologies,
training, and other factors affecting individual performance. Since evidence from
manufacturing departments indicated that bringing employees together in small
groups helped solve quality problems, NEC imported the concept of quality circles.
Next, in 1981, NEC created a formal, company-wide organization covering all aspects
of software production, management, services, sales, and training, under the SWQC
(Software Quality Control) Program.
The Software Problem Strategy Project, another three-year effort launched in
1982, attempted to encou rage more standa rdization i n development and qual ity-control
practices, explore various productivity-improvement measures, and establish or
formally designate a series of software factories to serve NEC's different product
divisions. Under this project, NEC executives decided to act in three areas. First,
they carried out a "software production mapping" that consisted of constructing a
logistical and organizational layout of programming operations within NEC by product
(basic software, industrial systems, business applications, transmission systems,
switching software, and microcomputer software), to determinewhich software houses
NEC's product divisions were using to assist in development and whether divisions
needed more help, such as new subsidiaries that might serve as additional software
factories. Second, they formalized and systematized procedures for managing
software subcontractors. Third, they launched another effort to improve and link
software productivity and quality-assurance measures by establishing a Software
Productivity Committee to study documentation control, quality control, software
productivity and quality measurements, cost estimation, personnel education, project
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management, support tools, and production environments.
Although NEC has not released as much performance data as Hitachi or Toshiba,
NEC did report major improvements in productivity through reusability in business
applications programming as well as significant gains in quality [43]. The SWQC
Program, for example, claimed to have achieved declines in defects reported for
transmission control software from an average of 1.37 faults per 1000 lines of code to
0.41. In minicomputer operating-system software, the decline in defects was from
0.35 per 1000 lines to 0.20 [50].
On theother hand, the centralized laboratory for software-engineering process
R&D did not work quite as well as NEC managers had hoped. Some laboratory
researchers had become too "academic" in orientation while engineers and SWQC teams
in the product divisions seemed to be doing more useful applied studies. To encourage
more practical research that better met the needs of divisions, but without eliminating
all basic research, a 1987 reorganization moved the basic researchers to NEC's Central
Research Laboratories. This involved no organizational change, since the Software
Product Engineering Laboratory had been a part of the central labs. However,
physically removing the more academic researchers left a group more concerned with
applications of new methods and tools. Management then expanded the number of
applied researchers and divided them into four areas under the umbrella of a newly
created C&C (Computers and Communications) Software Development Group.
The Software Planning Office took charge of running the company-wide
software quality-control effort. The Software Engineering Development Laboratory
conducted research on tools and integrated development environments, as well as
software-engineering management, and established a consulting department to help
transfer technology or assist operating divisions and subsidiaries. The C&C Common
Software Development Laboratory developed basic-software packages for
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microcomputers, while the C&C Systems I nterface Laboratory worked on compatibility
and network technology.
3.6 Fujitsu: Process Control to Automated Customization
Fujitsu established a basic software division within its hardware factory in the
mid-1970s that closely resembled Hitachi's Software Works in practices and
organization except that Fujitsu kept basic hardware development on the same site as
basic software development. An important characteristic of Fujitsu's development
approach and organization was the gradual integration of controls for product,
process, and quality. Direction of Fujitsu's efforts in these areas, as at NEC, came
from the Quality Assurance Department in the Numazu Works's Software Division.
According to a chronology the department prepared, these efforts fell into
three main phases: prior to 1970, when Fujitsu had no set procedures and managers
allowed programmers totest software at their own discretion; 1970-1978, when Fujitsu
set up its first product and process standards and formal systems for inspection and
quality control; and after 1978, when Fujitsu began placing more emphasis on
structured design and programming techniques and established the procedures that
formed the basis of its current practices. Distinguishing the last phase was a
broadening of the Quality Assurance Department's concerns to include not simply
testing and documentation conformance, or product evaluation, but analysis of the
development process itself. Like Hitachi, Toshiba, and NEC, these practices brought
major improvements in quality as well as productivity, with, for example, the number
of defects in all outstanding basic-software code supported by Fujitsu dropping from
0.19 per 1000 lines in 1977 to 0.01 in 1985 [19, 77].
In applications, Fujitsu's decision to create a software factory stemmed from the
same need SDC as well as Hitachi, Toshiba, and NEC had encountered: to produce a
38
III
variety of nominally different programs more efficiently, primarily sold with the
company's own hardware and basic software. Management began cautiously. First,
it experimented with a centralized organization by setting up a Software Conversion
Factory Department in 1977, with approximately 100 personnel. This modified
programs customers wanted to run on new machines, which were not compatible with
Fujitsu's previous architectures, as well as software originally written for other
companies' machines foroperation on Fujitsu hardware. Managers believed conversion
work was fairly straightforward and that centralization of personnel and equipment
would foster standardization and thus dissemination of good methods and tools,
making tasks easier to manage and resulting in h.h'ler productivity and quality. This
seemed feasible especially since, in coordination with the factory establishment, a
team of Fujitsu engineers defined a set of structured design and programming
techniques as well as detailed procedures for project management, called SDEM
(Software Development Engineering Methodology), and introduced support tools for
programming in Fortran, called SDSS (Software Development Support System), which
Fujitsu quickly replaced with tools for COBOL programming [52].
The conversion factory worked well enough to expand the facility to include
program construction by adding another 200 personnel and charging them with
turning requirements specifications received from systems engineers into code. Prior
to this, Fujitsu had managed systems engineering and program construction in
integrated projects, with no separation of these two functions. But the process for
new development did not work smoothly for all projects. Much like SDC had
experienced a few years earlier (but without publicizing this), Fujitsu managers
found that many projects depended on close interactions with customers and
knowledge of very different requirements, or that writing the application program
required access to proprietary information which customers, for security reasons,
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preferred not to give Fujitsu personnel unless they worked at the customers' own
sites. On other occasions, Fujitsu needed to provide programming services at
locations around Japan, again departing from the centralized factory model. In
addition, as Fujitsu improved the tools and reuse databases available in the factory,
less-experienced programmers became better able to build complete systems on their
own, making separation of work and use of more skilled engineers unnecessary.
Rather than abandoning the objective of streamlining software development
through a factory approach, Fujitsu improved its system gradually, recognizing that
different projects had different optimal processes. The major change consisted of
expanding the scope of work in the factory departments to let factory personnel do
detailed design and eventually systems design for projects where it was difficult or
unnecessary to separate these tasks, either for logistical reasons or because factory
engineers had the expertise to design and build systems on their own.
Fujitsu introduced other changes. One encouraged systems engineers outside
the factory, who initially did surveys and project planning, systems design, and a
program's structural design, to leverage their expertise more widely not only by
letting the factory personnel do more work but by writing software packages to cover
the needs of many users -- with a single design effort. Any packages or pieces of
them that Fujitsu could deploy for custom jobs, as is or modified, reduced the need to
write new software. In addition, to spread the burden of programming more widely,
Fujitsu management established or engaged more subsidiaries and subcontractors, as
well as leased methods, tools, and training services to customers of Fujitsu hardware,
beginning with SDEM in 1980.
The Systems Engineering Group, Fujitsu's primary organization for custom
applications as well as package development, consisted of three main areas with
several divisions, departments, and subsidiaries, as well as a research institute. One
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area, the Common Technology Divisions, included the SE (Systems-Engineering)
Technical Support Center, the Applications Software Planning Division, and the
Office Computer Systems Support Division. The SE Technical Support Center housed
the Software Factory Department and a portion of its 1500 to 2000 associated
programmers, as well as other departments for Systems Development Engineering
(technology planning and transfer), Information Support (product information for
customers), Systems Engineering Support Services (tools and methods), and the
Japanese SIGMA project (a joint company and government effort started in 1985 by
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry in an attempt to disseminate,
through a national communications network and sndardization around Unix as a
programming environment, the same type of work stations, support tools, and
reusable-softwaretechniques that factories such as Toshiba's relied on). Thefactory
built about 20% of new applications done in the Systems Engineering Group as well as
handled about 75% of all program conversion work (modifying software to run on new
Fujitsu machines). Most of the remaining jobs, approximately 800 small projects per
year in the late 1980s, went to approximately three dozen subsidiaries as well as
subcontractors outside the factory. A second area consisted of departments with
systems engineers specializing in particular industry applications (finance,
insurance, securities, manufacturing, distribution, NTT, scientific, technical,
government), so that they had adequate knowledge to specify customer requirements
and accurate system designs. The third area, functionally specialized departments of
systems engineers, designed management information systems, "value-added
networks" for different on-line services, personal-computer systems, and software
for new telecommunication firms (the new common carriers or NCCs) (Table 9).
To support its Systems Engineering Group, similar to Hitachi, Toshiba, and
NEC, Fujitsu also developed a large collection of computer-aided tools, perhaps the
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largest in Japan. Factory personnel found these tools especially useful to facilitate
the process of custom applications design and programming. For example, EPGII
(Executive Planning Guide II) outlined planning and analysis procedures as well as
presented work sheets useful for designing corporate information-management
systems, helping systems engineers map out a customer's needs against systems
already existing in the company. C-NAPII (Customer-Needs Analysis Procedures I)
set forth another series of procedures and work sheets to define the specifications
necessary to write the software [54]. PARADIGM supported module design and
coding, testing and maintenance, as well as reuse, for batch-processing and
relatively simple transactions-processing applications. A library that came with the
tool stored functional and structural program specifications, standard design patterns
written in flow-chart form (which could be compiled automatically), and executable
subroutines for common functions [53]. ACS-APG (Application Control Support-
Application Program Generator), a refinement of PARADIGM for developing more
complex on-line transactions-processing systems through modifiable logic tables,
offered users more functions on preset screens (menus) as well as allowed them more
flexibility in describing input/output logic in outline form. Engineers could also use
the ACS functions to produce a prototype system before completing the design and
coding [37].
BAGLES (Banking Application Generator Library for Extensive Support),
another specialized version of PARADIGM, served as the primary tool in the software
factory and other Fujitsu facilities (as well as many customer sites) for producing
standard banking software, such as to control automated teller machines or move
funds among different bank locations through on-line transfers. BAGLES/CAD made
it possible for users with little knowledge of programming to produce complete
programs in half the time experts writing in COBOL would normally require, relying
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on decision tables that helped users define banking operations and integrate packaged
subsystems and reusable patterns with new designs [68, 73]. CASET (Computer-
Aided Software Engineering Tool) supported development of common business
applications such as inventory or sales control systems written in COBOL, relying on
preset lists or tables in conversational Japanese to help users define common fu nctions
[69]. Software CAD contained general-purpose notations combining text, tables, and
diagrams, as well as an editor and compilers that transformed standardized notations
into modifiable design documents and then code in different computer languages for
a growing variety of applications [76].
4. Conclusions
This review of factory efforts demonstrates how major software producers
moved beyond ad hoc practices and closer to approaches that resembled flexible
design and production systems, producing a variety of software products more
efficiently than building each from scratch. Software factories were able to adjust
over time to different kinds of product requirements as well as to evolution in process
technology, such as the emerge-ice of computer-aided tools, but they capitalized on
recycling reusable components as well as standardizing development methods and
tools, at least temporarily, thus avoiding the need to rely completely on highly skilled
software engineers. There was also a growing body of evidence that Japan's major
software producers were now at least comparable to top U.S. firms in basic measures
of programming productivity and quality, and were able to compete effectively with
U.S. firms at least in the Japanese market [19, 20, 23, 56, 70, 71].
The most important element in the factory initiatives was a decision on the part
of key engineers, division managers, and top executives that software was not an
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unmanageable technology. This conviction led to an initial phase of creating formal
organizations and control systems for managing software development, rather than
continuing to treat programming as a loosely organized service provided to customers
on an ad hoc basis primarily to facilitate hardware sales. Imposing greater structure
on the development process while effectively accommodating different types of
software products also demanded a product focus for facilities or departments to limit
the range of problems managers and programmers faced.
Of the two firms that initially established factories, Hitachi persevered through
a decade of trial and error, while SDC encountered problems in managing a variety of
projects and ultimately ceased operating. Subse. ent phases of evolution in factories
that continued to operate were comparable at Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu, as
summarized in Table 10. All went th rough periods of tailoring methods, tools, control
systems, and standards to different product families; developing tools to mechanize
or automate aspects of project management, code generation, testing, documentation
generation; refining their development tools and techniques as well as extending them
to subsidiaries, subcontractors, and customers; pursuing greater levels of
integration among tools through engineering workbenches as well as adding new
functions, such as to support reuse, design, and requirements analysis; and
gradually increasing the types of products under development as well as paying more
attention to issues such as product functionality, ease of use, and even product
innovation. Over time, the software factories at Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu
also tended to become design and systems-engineering centers, with in-house
engineers and staff performing critical design operations and project management as
well as quality assurance functions, but with subsidiaries and other subcontractors
taking over most of the actual programming work. Throughout this evolution,
however, the Japanese continued to exhibit long-term management commitments and
44
integrated efforts -- above the level of individual programmers and individual projects
-- to structure and support software development along the lines of "best practice"
as suggested in the software-engineering literature and in ways that suited Japan's
market and industry conditions.
While more time and research are needed to interpret more fully the significance
of Japan's efforts in software technology, it is already apparent that management
approaches in the software factories have not been contrary in spirit or style to
Japanese achievements in other industries. Managers of production and engineering
organizations in general face the problem of balancing efficiency and flexibility, and
it is in achieving this balance -- managing for scope as well as scale economies -- that
Japanese firms have so often excelled. This is true even though companies in
industries such as automobiles have sought this balance from the opposite end of the
spectrum compared to software producers such as Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and
Fujitsu, reflecting the states of their respective industries.
In automobiles, thechallengeJapanesefirms encountered afterWorld War I I was
first to move away from the rigidities of conventional mass production, as epitomized
in the American automobile industry. U.S. firms had evolved far beyond one-of-a-
kind job-shop production to producing cars in massive volumes but with little model
variety, unskilled and overly specialized workers, high degrees of fixed automation,
and static rather than dynamic concepts of management. In software, the challenge
Japanese firms encountered during the 1960s and 1970s was not too much process
rigidity and product standardization but, on the contrary, too little structure,
discipline, and standardization or repeatability from job to job and product to product
(Figure 2). The software industry seemed transfixed in an inefficient mode of craft-
like or job-shop operations, with each project treated as unique and with little reuse
of production elements or even process knowledge, except by chance or on an ad hoc
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basis. This situation proved to be intolerable to companies suffering from a shortage
of skilled personnel and facing increased demand for new, complex, and reliable
softwa re prog rams.
As for the future of Japanese-style factories as a way of organizing software
development (and perhaps other types of design and engineering work), it remained
possible that large centralized factory organizations represented a transitional stage
in the evolution of Japan's approach to managing software development technology.
Between the late 1960s and the early 1990s, the factory initiatives provided a useful
mechanism to centralize, study, and manage a series of projects more efficiently than
treating each effort as separate, with scale economies restricted to individual jobs and
no scope economies systematically exploited. With improvements in electronic
communications technology, it was no longer essential to concentrate large numbers
of people in single locations, as seen in the NEC and Fujitsu cases, although Hitachi
and Toshiba managers clearly preferred to bring people together, and it seemed more
likely that factory-like organizations would continue to co-exist with job shops,
depending on the kind of software being built as well as company objectives.
In general, factory strategies appeared best suited for software systems that
could rely on reusable designs and components as well as common development tools
and techniques. For totally new or innovative design efforts, Japanese software
producers tended to utilize less structured organizational forms, such as special
projects, laboratories, or subsidiaries and subcontractors, that gave individual
engineers more freedom to invent and innovate. To the extent that Japanese firms
wished to place more emphasis on individual creativity, they were likely to build more
software in non-factory environments as well as emphasizethe design and engineering
roles of personnel in internal projects, especially since new engineering recruits in
Japan seemed to prefer labels other than "factory" to describe their places of work.
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On the other hand, software programs continued to grow in size and complexity
along with computer processing capabilities, demanding more rather than fewer skills
in coordination and management. Computing as well as programming demands also
appeared to change more in an incremental rather than radical fashion, with progress
constrained to some extent by enormous existing investments in current software and
hardware systems. While some new design and programming techniques, such as
object orientation, made it possible to break up designs and projects more easily into
small pieces, and facilitated reusability, this methodology still required extensive
product and project coordination. The diffusion of packaged software products as
well as improvements in computer-aided tools made it increasingly easy for computer
users, even those without software training, to buy, make, or modify their own
programs, although Japanese firms were also developing packages as well as
conducting extensive research on new tools and techniques, and then introducing
them gradually into their development operations. It thus seemed likely that software
producers in Japan and elsewhere who wished to balance efficiency (productivity and
quality control, project and budget control) with flexibility or creativity (some, but
not all, innovative or fully customized featu res) over a series of similar projects would
continue to refine the kind of organizational approaches and process technologies
found in Japanese software factories, whatever labels they used for their facilities.
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Figure 1: Competitive Priorities and Key Tasks on the Product-Process Matrix
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Figure 2: Production-Management Objectives
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Source: [19], p. 44 1.
III
Table 1: Organizational Environment and Structural Fit
Environment
Characteristics
COMPLEX
STABLE DYNAMIC
Professional Bureaucracy Adhocracy
skills standardization mutual adjustment
(e.g. hospital) (e.g. large job shop
or large project)
SIMPLE Machine Bureaucracy
process standardization
(e.g. conventional mass-
production factory)
Note: The terms underlined indicate the basic
structural configuration.
Simple Structure
direct supervision
(e.g. small job shop
or small project)
method of coordination for each
Source: Adapted from [12], p. 5, and [49], p. 286.
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Table 2: Organizational Structure and Technology
Structure Technology Tasks & Problems Characteristics
Machine Routine, Few exceptions, Standardized and de-skilled
Bureaucracy Mass well-defined work, centralization, divisions
Production of labor, high formalization
of rules and procedures
Professional Engineering Many exceptions, Standardized and specialized
Bureaucracy well-defined skills, decentralization, low
formalization
Adhocracy Non-routine Many exceptions, Specialized skills but few or
ill-defined no organization standards,
decentralization, low
formalization
Simple Unit or Few exceptions, Few standardized specialized
Structure Craft ill-defined skills, centralized authority but
low formalization
Source: [49, 57, 75].
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Table 3: Conventional Craft/Job Shop and Factory Comparison
CRAFT OR JOB-SHOP PRODUCTION
Strategy: Make Customized Products for Individual Customers
Attain High Premiums for this Service
Implementation: Non-Standard Inputs
Non-Standard Processes
Non-Standard Outputs
Little Division & Specialization of Labor
Low Level of Process Automation
Relatively High Worker Skills & Discretion
Relatively Low Level of Management Control
Few or No Economies of Scale
Some Scope Economies Based on Individual Knowledge
Tradeoff: Product-Process Flexibility Over Process Efficiency
CONVENTIONAL FACTORY DESIGN AND PRODUCTION
Strategy: Mass Production of Limited Number of Commodity Products
Charge Low Prices But Generate Large Volumes
Implementation: Standard Inputs
Standard Processes
Standard Outputs
High Division and Specialization of Labor
High Level of Process Automation
Relatively Low Worker Skills and Discretion
Relatively Low Level of Management Control
High Economies of Scale
Some Scope Economies Based on Common Components and Shared
Resources or Assets
Tradeoff: Process Efficiency Over Product- Process Flexibility
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Design and Production System
Make a Variety of Semi-Customized Products Sold at Medium Prices
Implementation:
Tradeoff:
Some Standard Inputs
Some Standard Processes
Semi-Standard (Semi-Custom) Outputs
Some Division and Specialization of Labor
Some Process Automation
Medium Level of Worker Skills and Discretion
Medium Level of Management Control
Some Economies of Scale for Repeat Jobs
High Scope Economies Based on Common Components and Shared
Resources or Assets
High System Planning and Development Costs Over Higher Process
Efficiency or Higher Product-Process Flexibility
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Strategy:
Table 4: Flexible
IiI
Table 5: Product-Process Strategies for Software Development
Product Type Process Strategy Organization Type
HIGH END:
Unique Designs Meet Customer Require-
(Full Custom, ments & Functionality
"Invention")
High-Priced Hire Skilled Workers CRAFT-ORIENTED
Premium To Design, Build Needed
Products Tools & Methods JOB SHOP
Small To Medium- No Organizational Skills
Size Systems To Perform A Series Of
Similar Jobs Or Do Large
Jobs Systematically
MIDDLE:
Partly Unique Balance Customer Needs
Designs & Functioinality With
(Semi-Custom) Production Cost, Quality
Medium-Priced Skilled Workers Mainly SOFTWARE
Products In Design, Standard
Development Process FACTORY
Small To Large- Organizational Skills
Sized Systems Cultivated To Build Large
Systems And Reuse Parts,
Methods, Tools, And People
Systematically
LOW END:
Unique, Mass- Maximize Application
Replicated Designs Functionality For
(Scale Economies) Average User Needs
APPLICATION-
Low-Priced Products Hire Highly-Skilled
(Packages) Workers Knowledgeable ORIENTED
In Application
PROJECT
Small to Medium- No Organizational Skills
Sized Systems To Develop Large Products
Or A Series Of Similar
Products Systematically
Source: [19], p. 15.
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Table 6: Major Japanese Software Factories
Key: BS
App
RT
Tel
Notes:
Est.
= Operating Systems, Database Management Systems, Language
Utilities, and Related Basic Software
= General Business Applications
= Industrial Real-Time Control Applications
= Telecommunications Software (Switching, Transmission)
All facilities develop software for mainframes or minicomputers.
Company Facility/Organization
1991
Estimated
1969 Hitachi Software Development Center 4000(Hitachi Software Works)
1976 NEC Software Strategy Project
Fu ; lu Works 3000
Mita Works 3000
Mita Wo, ks 2000
Abiko Works 2000
Tamagawa Works 2000
1977 Toshiba Fuchu Software Factory 2500
1979 Fujitsu Systems Engineering Group 5000(Kamata Software Factory 2000)
1983 Fujitsu Numazu Software Divisiop 4000(Numazu Works est. 1974)
1985 Hitachi Information Systems 7000
Source: Company information and site visits.
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Table 7: Elements of the Toshiba Software Factory
Combined Tool, Methodology, and Management Systems
Project progress management system
Cost management system
Productivity management system
Quality assurance system with standardized quality metrics
A standardized, baseline management system for design review,
inspection and configuration management
Software tools, user interfaces and tool maintenance facilities
Existing software library and maintenance support for this
Technical data library
Standardized technical methodologies and disciplines
Documentation support system
Personnel Systems
-- Quality circle activities
-- Education programs
- - Career development system
Physical Infrastructure
-- Specially designed work spaces
Source: [46], p. 155.
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Table 8: NEC Software Factory Implementation
YEAR IN ITIATIVE FOCUS/OUTCOMES
1974 Basic Software Development Organizational separation of
Division software from ha rdwa re development
1976-1979 Software Strategy Project Standardization of data collection, tool
and structured-programming
methodology for basic and applications
software throughout the NEC group,
with the objectives of raising
productivity and quality
1980 Software Product Centralization of process and
Engineering Laboratory tool R&D for dissemination to divisions
and subsidiaries
1981 Software Quality Control Establishment of a group-wide
(SWQC) methodology, training program, and
control measures for improving
software quality, including quality
circle activities
1982-1985 Software Problem Strategy 1) "Mapping" of software
Project development activities
2) Subcontracting management
3) Software productivity improvement
1986 Software-Factory Design Establishment of Hoku ri ku Softwa re
Project Development Center, based on
ergonomic principles and other
softwa re-factory concepts
1987 C&C Software Development Reorganization of the Software
Group Product Engineering Laboratory and
expansion of applied research
Source: [19], p. 288.
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Table 9: Fujitsu Systems Engineering Group and Applications Factory
COMMON TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENTS
SE Technical Support Center
-- Systems Development Engineering Department
-- Software Factory Department
-- Information Support Center Department
-- Systems Engineering Support Services Department
-- SIGMA Project Systems Promotion Office
Office Computer Systems Support Service Division
Application Software Planning Division
-- Application Software Planning Department
- Software Distribution Department
INDUSTRY-RELATED DEPARTMENTS
Finance
Insu rance/Secu rities
Manufacturing/Distribution
Scientific/Tech n ical
NTT
Government/Mass - Communication
FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTS
Management Information Systems
VAN (Value-Added Network) Systems Engineering
Information Network Systems Engineering
Personal Computer Systems Engineering
NCC (New Common Carriers) Systems Engineering
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING SUBSIDIARIES
Industry-Related
Functional
Regional
FUJITSU RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ECONOMICS
Source: [56], p. 79, updated.
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Table 10: Phases of Factory Structuring in Software
Phase I:
(Mid-1960s
to Early
1970s)
Formalized Organization and Management Structure
Factory Objectives Established
Product Focus Determined
Process Data Collection and Analysis Begun
Initial Control Systems Introduced
Phase II: Technology Tailoring and Standardization
(Early Control Systems and Objectives Expanded
1970s Standard Methods Adopted for Design, Coding, Testing,
to Early Documentation, Maintenance
1980s) On-Line Development Through Terminals
Program Libraries Introduced
Integrated Methodology and Tool Development Begun
Employee Training Programs to Standardize Skills
Phase III: Process Mechanization and Support
(Late Introduction of Tools Supporting Project Control
1970s) Introduction of Tools to Generate Code, Test Cases,
and Documentation
Integration of Tools with On-line Databases and Engineering Work
Benches Begun
Phase IV: Process Refinement and Extension
(Early Revisions of Standards
1980s) Introduction of New Methods and Tools
Establishment of Quality Control and Quality Circle Programs
Transfer of Methods and Tools to Subsidiaries, Subcontractors,
Hardware Customers
Phase V: Integrated and Flexible Automation
(Mid-1980s) Increase in Capabilities of Existing Tools
Introduction of Reuse-Support Tools
Introduction of Design-Automation Tools
Introduction of Requirements Analysis Tools
Further Integration of Tools Through Engineering Work Benches
Phase VI: Incremental Product/Variety Improvement
(Late 1980s Process Reliability Control, Followed By More Emphasis on:
and Early Product Functionality Ease of Use
1990s) More Types of Products (eg. Software Packages)
More "Creative" Development Organizations
Source: [19], p. 454, revised.
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NOTES
1. Few concepts have been discussed as widely and defined as vaguely as "flexibility"
in manufacturing. In this paper, I use the term primarily to refer to the ability of a
system, for manufacturing, product development, or service operations, to
accommodate variety or customization in product offerings with minimal losses in
efficiency or quality. For a review of literature and general framework dealing with
flexibility, see [65].
2. For a more detailed discussion of the material in this section, see [19].
3. Without changing its particular factory strategy, process, or organization, Hitachi
renamed its two main software facilities as "development centers" in 1991 to reflect
their changing roles and images to potential Japanese recruits. By the early 1990s,
both facilities had evolved from designing and producing software, using college
graduates with technical as well as liberal arts backgrounds, in addition to less
educated employees for programming, to become the centers for Hitachi's software
design and systems-engineering efforts. Much of the actual software programming
was also done by subsidiaries and other subcontractors, as well as by automated tools.
Furthermore, Hitachi managers believed that new college graduates in Japan and other
countries (whom Hitachi wanted to recruit) preferred the name "development center"
to "factory" or "kojo," since the latter had blue-collar connotations in addition to
nuances that Hitachi management continued to emphasize, such as productivity as well
as quality and process control. [These comments are based on written responses to
questions posed by this author received from Mr. Tsurayuki Kado, Chief Instructor,
Computer Education and Training Department, Computer Division, Hitachi Ltd., 21
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and 26 August 1991; and from Mr. Kanji Shibata, Deputy General Manager, Software
Development Center, Computer Division, Hitachi Ltd., 27 August 1991. ]
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